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Eavesdropping as Rhetorical Tactic: 
History, Whiteness, and Rhetoric 
Krista Ratcliffe 
Man is a broken creature .... It is his nature as a human being 
to be so; but it is also his nature to create relationships that can 
span the brokenness. This is his first responsibility; when he 
fails, he is inevitably destroyed. 
-Lillian Smith 
At a cocktail party at the ecce convention in 1997, I overheard a male 
voice say, "I guess it's hip to be a white guy again, huh?" I immediately 
wondered, "How did whiteness become a hip topic at cocktail parties? 
And does he think it's hip to be a white' gal' too?" After returning home, 
I continued to wonder about what his words implied. How does history 
function so as to make such comments possible? What exactly does it 
mean to be "a white guy"? And how do history and whiteness (and the 
history of whiteness) inform rhetoric and composition studies? This 
comment, the fortuitous moment of overhearing it, and my subsequent 
questions have haunted me ever since, ultimately compelling me to write 
this article, which proposes eavesdropping as a rhetorical tactic and then 
employs it to investigate intersections of history , whiteness, and rhetoric. 
In the United States, scholarly discussions of history and rhetoric 
have rarely included whiteness as a principal object of analysis. Instead, 
when rhetoric was first recovered for composition studies, rhetorical 
theories were presented as ahistorical structures that could be lifted from, 
say, fourth-century BeE Greece and dropped into, say, twentieth-century 
U.S. politics in an effort to persuade, say, Southern Democrats to vote for 
Richard Nixon (circa 1968) and George W. (circa 2000). The idea was that 
rhetorical theories are timeless; the applications, time-bound. This idea 
has been challenged by scholars, such as James Berlin, who have argued 
that rhetorical theories are not timeless but are always grounded in the 
sites of their origins (U5). This idea has also been challenged by 
scholars-again, such as James Berlin-who have argued that rhetorical 
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theories are always grounded in their sites of usage in ways that remake 
the theories and make it impossible simply to transport those theories 
unchanged from one site to another (116). Often such transformation is 
posited as a potentially positive move. And rightly so. Note Susan 
Jarratt's feminist transformations of sophistic rhetorical theory in Re-
reading the Sophists and Cheryl Glenn's feminist transformations of 
classical rhetorical theory in Rhetoric Retold. But what happens when 
change is not a positive move, when it is what John Poulakos calls 
"dysfunctional" (90)? In other words, what happens when a transforma-
tion in a rhetorical theory denies the influence of cultural categories, such 
as whiteness? One answer is that such transformations circumscribe the 
possibilities of rhetorical theories and rhetorical usages. 1 
To avoid such circumscription, we must begin to factor whiteness into 
our theories and praxes; but given the absence of whiteness in many of our 
disciplinary conversations, we may first need to define the term. In the 
past decade, whiteness studies has emerged as an academic enterprise 
attempting to articulate such a definition by critiquing how whiteness 
functions both productively and dysfunctionally. 2 Despite the popularity 
of whiteness studies, feminist and ethnicity scholars have questioned 
whether it is really a forum for laying all our cultural cards on the table or 
just a forum for rechanneling money and attention to white folks, 
particularly the boys (Talbot 118). At its best, whiteness studies questions 
the dominant culture's tendency to define race in binary terms ofblackl 
white while only articulating blackness. Scholars working in this field 
acknowledge that whiteness speaks as does the slash mark. And they 
typically argue that because whiteness is impossible to understand apart 
from its intersections with gender, class, age, and so on, whiteness 
functions differently not just for people of color and for whites but also 
for particular people whose lives may be shaped differently by each of 
these categories of experience (Thompson 94). 
Despite the recent emergence of whiteness studies, whiteness is 
hardly a new topic. By necessity, people of color have been quite savvy 
throughout U.S. history in articulating its power, privilege, and violence. 
Most whites have refused to see it, let alone critique its dysfunctions. But 
not all. In the 1940s, Lillian Smith named and critiqued whiteness in 
Killers of the Dream, her autobiography of growing up white and female 
in the South, and thereby kissed a writerly reputation goodbye-at least 
for that particular moment. In the 1960s, Killers was embraced by the 
Civil Rights Movement and reprinted; in the 1970s it was celebrated by 
the white feminist movement; and, in the midst of the explosion of interest 
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in whiteness in the 1990s (largely due to whiteness studies), it has been 
reissued once again. What accounts for these different receptions? Not 
Smith's "rhetorical stance" (Booth 111), not the "rhetorical situation" of 
her audiences (Bitzer 6), not even their respective "discourse communi-
ties" (1. Harris 101-02). The difference lies in the circling of time-that 
is, when bodies, tropes and cultures converge to make possible moments 
of rhetorical usage. Only in these moments of convergence, when bodies 
are troped and tropes are embodied, may personal and cultural change be 
effected. 
As I listen to echoes ofthe comment I overheard at the cocktail party, 
it strikes me that one way to make possible these moments of convergence 
is by what I will call rhetorical eavesdropping. More specifically, I make 
four moves in this article: first, I redefine eavesdropping as an ethical 
rhetorical tactic and posit it as a means for investigating history, white-
ness, and rhetoric; second, I offer a mode of historiography, or thinking 
about history, that shifts emphasis from origins to usage, foregrounding 
how we may circle through history even as history circles through us; 
third, I trace the trope of whiteness in the United States, not to provide a 
comprehensive definition but to expose its dysfunctions; and, fourth, I 
circle through history to argue that, within the United States, the dysfunc-
tions of whiteness have remade rhetorical theory in ways that circum-
scribe available agencies. 
The Rhetorical Tactic of Eavesdropping, Eavesdropping as 
Tactical Ethic 
As Lynn Worsham remarked in her response to an earlier draft of this 
article, differences exist between accidental overhearing and purposeful 
eavesdropping. Her remarks prompted these thoughts: if overhearing the 
comment at the cocktail party was accidental yet productive, perhaps such 
productivity could be more systematically tapped if purposeful overhear-
ing, or eavesdropping, were imagined as a rhetorical tactic. But given the 
negative connotations associated with eavesdropping, such a claim, at the 
very least, raises questions of definition, justification, ethics, and prag-
matics. In this section, I explore these questions in order to demonstrate 
that eavesdropping may be employed effectively not only as a rhetorical 
tactic but also as an ethical choice and thus a tactical ethic. 
To define eavesdropping for rhetoric and composition studies, I want 
to borrow one aspect of Mary Daly's method of "gynocentric writing"-
namely, uncovering potentialities in words by studying their dictionary 
definitions, reworking those definitions, and excavating their etymolo-
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gies. The goal of Daly's method is to expose the gendered dismissal of 
words and to mine their "obsolete" meanings (24). A common dictionary 
definition of eavesdrop is "to listen secretly to the private conversation of 
others" (Webster's New). This term has acquired a gendered connotation 
that has associated eavesdropping with feminine busybodiness. Gladys 
Kravitz, the nosy neighbor on Bewitched, is the perfect example of the 
busybody and habitual eavesdropper. But a second hearing ofthe possi-
bilities still contained within this term opens it up to the kind of redefini-
tion that Daly calls for. Old English etymologies of eaves, for example, 
suggest "edge" and "margin" and "border" (Webster's New; Oxford); an 
archaic definition of eavesdrop suggests "to learn or overhear" (Webster's 
Third); and a Middle English definition of eavesdropper suggests "one 
who stands on the eavesdrop [the spot where water drops from the eaves] 
in order to listen to conversations inside the house" (Random). Together, 
these lexical threads weave a composite definition of eavesdropping that 
may offer an effective rhetorical tactic: standing outside, in an uncomfort-
able spot, on the border of knowing and not knowing, granting others the 
inside position, listening to learn. Through such a composite definition, 
eavesdropping becomes not a gendered busybodiness but a rhetorical 
tactic of purposely positioning oneself on the edge of one's own knowing 
so as to overhear and learn from others and, I would add, from oneself. 
Such a tactic is needed because in our daily exchanges we are too often 
positioned like viewers of Bewitched: we are seduced into identifying 
with the main characters of cultural discourses just as viewers are charmed 
into identifying with Samantha and Darren. In The Other Side of Lan-
guage: A Philosophy of Listening, Gemma Corradi Fiumara contends that 
the "bewitchment of these authoritative voices appears to persist as long 
as they address us directly" (58). But what if we position ourselves so that 
these "authoritative voices" are not addressing us directly? What if we 
position ourselves as eavesdroppers? In other words, what if we align 
ourselves with Gladys Kravitz, granting her the presumption of truth 
instead oflaughing at her? (She was usually right, you know.) When we 
choose to position ourselves in such a way, we hear differently; and the 
results may just be worthwhile. According to Fiumara, "listening creates 
a minimal but fertile logical passage which will then allow our minds to 
move with greater freedom and envisage still further ways of approaching 
reality." Moreover, Fiumara claims, "the more one listens the more one 
is absorbed by an awareness of the fragility of our [own] doctrines" (161, 
191). In other words, rhetorical eavesdropping may be a tactic for 
listening to the discourses of others, for hearing over the edges of our own 
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knowing, for thinking what is commonly unthinkable within our own 
logics. 
In "Rhetorical Listening," I describe a process for listening to the 
discourses of others that, first, acknowledges the existence of these 
discourses; second, it listens for the (un)conscious presences, absences, 
unknowns; and third, it consciously integrates this information into our 
world views and decision-making (206). Rhetorical listening, as I define 
it, must be considered alongside rhetorical eavesdropping because eaves-
dropping, as one kind of rhetorical listening, more sharply tunes listeners 
into the "private conversation of others," conversations in which eaves-
droppers are not directly addressed (Webster's New). 
Eavesdropping as a rhetorical tactic raises questions about ethics 
because it demands a consideration of how the self and other find a way 
of being together in the world. The first ethical issue to consider is the 
belief that eavesdropping is an invasion of privacy. The so-called com-
mon definition validates this belief; however, my reworked definition 
makes this claim groundless, since rhetorical eavesdropping entails 
positioning oneself to overhear both oneself and others, listening to learn, 
and being careful (that is, full of care) notto overstep another's boundaries 
or interrupt the agency of another's discourse. The second ethical issue to 
consider is the danger of romanticizing the outsider's position. Rhetorical 
eavesdropping is not the rhetorical version of "slumming," which merely 
reinscribes existing cultural positions. Rather, rhetorical eavesdropping 
does not deny the very real power differentials of existing cultural 
positions, but assumes that all cultural positions possess an inside and an 
outside. The trick for eavesdroppers is to find an outside position where 
they are not directly addressed. The third ethical issue to consider is one's 
own willingness not just to eavesdrop but to hear. As Fiumara asserts, "in 
our basic logic it is only possible to advocate an ethical attitude with 
regard to something or someone who can say something to us, someone 
who can make himself heard. And yet the point at issue is whether we 
are capable of hearing a message and whether we select or predeter-
mine what we hear" (61-62). Fiumara's claim warrants further reflec-
tion from all of us. 
One path of reflection is pragmatic: how does rhetorical eavesdrop-
ping play itself out in daily life? A person may eavesdrop on him- or 
herself, on other people's conversations, on written texts, on TV adver-
tisements. The possibilities are endless. For example, when I talk to my 
daughter in my mother's voice (double meaning intended), perhaps I 
should mentally shift my rhetorical positioning and eavesdrop on myself 
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from my daughter's point of hearing. When my students talk before class 
about one of our readings (when they know I am in the room and can hear 
them even though they are not directly addressing me), perhaps I should 
eavesdrop and use their questions, concerns, applications as a way into 
class discussion. When I read a scholarly text on an unfamiliar subject, 
perhaps I should approach the text by trying to weave the edges of my 
knowledge into the article's claims. And when I view a TV ad for a 
political candidate I dislike, perhaps I should heed why its addressed 
audience finds it so compelling. In each instance, eavesdropping may 
enhance critical thinking by helping me better assess the situation. 
Will eavesdropping work well in all situations? Will it work equally 
well forpeople in all cultural positions? Will it expose that the unthinkab Ie 
is always a better way of thinking? The answer to all these questions is 
obvious: of course not. As with all rhetorical tactics, kairos factors into 
usage. But eavesdropping as a rhetorical tactic possesses potential for 
mapping common ground among people. In this way, it may be employed 
generally as a tactical ethic; it may also be employed specifically here as 
a rhetorical tactic to intervene in the structuring of history , whiteness, and 
rhetoric. 
The Uses of History, History as Usage 
The dominant narrative mode for thinking about history at this century's 
end, at least in the United States, is an origins mode, one that begins at the 
beginning (which is assumed to be obvious) and moves in a linear, 
evolutionary progression. My undergraduate students deeply desire and 
defend the origins mode, despite journalistic warnings about Gen-X's 
social and economic regression. So do most members of the mainstream 
culture. So, too, do some of our histories of rhetoric. James Berlin agrees: 
"Our' official' histories of rhetoric-the formulations of George Kennedy 
(1980a) and Edward P.J. Corbett (1990) and Brian Vickers (1990) and 
Wilbur Samuel Howell (1971), forexampl~epictrhetoric's historical 
trajectory as a march of ideas, ideas characterized as unified, coherent, 
and rational" (112). The appealing features of the origins mode are 
obvious; the unappealing ones, less so. What gets displaced in the origins 
mode is the presence of the past in thepresent--or, the then-that-is-now-
and what gets further displaced is people's sense of accountability for the 
then-that-is-now. Although rhetorical theorists have challenged the ori-
gins mode in order to rethink rhetorical history (for example, Victor 
Vitanza's excellent collection Writing Histories ojRhetoric3), I offer yet 
another challenge to the origins mode of historiography, one that fore-
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grounds our accountability for the then-that-is-now in our daily lives. 
Drawing on the work of Martin Heidegger, W.E.B. Du Bois, and Toni 
Morrison, I offer a mode of historiography that not only shifts our focus 
from origins to usage but also demonstrates how we may eavesdrop on 
history, circling through time in order to expose the circling oftime. Such 
a mod~ will help me in the next section of this paper to analyze our 
accountability for the rhetoric of whiteness. 
In What Is Called Thinking? Heidegger ponders the connections 
between the movement oftime, the movement of thinking, and the sphere 
oflanguage (what today we might call discourse). In Heidegger's view, 
sometimes the "only way to go forward is to return to the origins and seek 
a new beginning," and he believes that the vehicle for circling through 
time is language-"that sphere in which man can dwell aright and make 
clear to himself who he is" (Gray xxv; xix). Heidegger is obviously not 
imagining time travel but mind travel-circling back to ''the origins" to 
trace how a historical moment emerges, how it gets constructed, how it 
becomes not just a past fact (something that happened) but a historical fact 
(something that happened and is preserved within cultural discourses) (E. 
Carr 10). 
Heidegger's circling through time is exemplified in Du Bois' "Dia-
logue with a White Friend." In the following passage, Du Bois replies to 
a fictional white friend's claim of white superiority: 
You are obsessed by the swiftness of the gliding of the sled at the bottom 
of the hill. You say: what tremendous power must have caused its speed, 
and how wonderful is Speed. You think of the rider as the originator and 
inventor of that vast power. You admire his poise and sang-froid, his utter 
self-absorption. You say: surely here is the son of God and he shall reign 
forever and ever. 
You are wrong, quite wrong. Away back on the level stretches of the 
mountain tops in the forests, amid drifts and driftwood, this sled was 
slowly and painfully pushed on its little hesitating start. It took power, but 
the power of sweating, courageous men, not of demigods. As the sled 
slowly started and gained momentum, it was the Law of Being that gave 
it speed, and the grace of God that steered its lone, scared passengers. 
Those passengers, white, black, red and yellow, deserve credit for their 
balance and pluck. But many times it was sheer luck that made the road 
not land the white man in the gutter, as it had others so many times before, 
and as it may him yet. He has gone farther than others because of others 
whose very falling made hard ways iced and smooth for him to traverse. 
His triumph is a triumph not of himself alone, but of humankind, from the 
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pusher in the primeval forests to the last flier through the winds of the 
twentieth century. (36-37) 
This passage not only exemplifies Heidegger' s concept of circling through 
time but also exposes the danger and difficulty of circling. The danger lies 
in embracing false origins, such as the sled at the bottom ofthe hill. In this 
instance, embracing false origins erases our knowledge of common effort 
and hence undermines our imperative to work for the common good. The 
difficulty lies in establishing true origins, such as the sled in the primeval 
forest. If(and let me stress if) true origins exist as single causal phenom-
ena, they may have occurred within our past but outside of our history, in 
which case they are either forgotten or remembered today as myths, 
legends, folklore, or speculation. As such, they may challenge the limits 
of our historical knowledge, but often they do not receive the same respect 
as historical knowledge. If (and let me again stress if) true origins exist as 
complicated, interwoven webs of phenomena, then they may be impos-
sible to pinpoint exactly (read: empirically) (Mountford). 
To sidestep this danger and this difficulty, let us shift our thinking 
about history from origins to usage. Let us heed Heidegger's advice and 
mind travel, but with a twist: instead of focusing on travelling back to a 
moment of origin, let us focus on traveling backfrom a particular moment 
of usage. Travelling from a moment of usage, we may find ourselves 
circling back through historical narratives, finding pertinent threads 
(rather than origins in the traditional sense) and weaving our way forward 
to our current moment. 4 This shift from origins to usage is more than the 
rhetorical sophistry denigrated by Plato. It is the rhetorical sophistry 
defined by Jarratt, a sophistry that links history to bodies, tropes, and 
cultures, a sophistry that does not forsake truth and ethics but demands 
their continual negotiation within different moments of usage (11-12). 
What emerges if we lay this usage-based mode of historiography 
(circling through time) alongside Toni Morrison's concept of "rememory" 
(the circling oftime)? As depicted in Beloved, rememory represents the 
embodied circling of time. It is an insidious embodiment for Sethe, the 
escaped slave who kills her two-year-old daughter rather than let her be 
taken back to the horrors of slavery on a plantation called Sweet Home. 
According to Morrison's narrator, rememory is triggered for Sethe by a 
smell, a sound, or a touch: "And suddenly there was Sweet Home rolling, 
rolling, rolling out before her eyes, and although there was not a leaf on 
that farm that did not make her want to scream, it rolled itself out before 
her in shameless beauty" (6). In this way, rememory has an agency all its 
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own. Rememory comes back whether or not Sethe wants it to return 
(14)-sometimes falsely (6), sometimes releasing repressed memories 
(61-62), but always serving as a testament to her seemingly infinite 
capacity to hear bad things (70). Still, Sethe and other characters assert 
some agency over rememory, at least for a while, via these coping 
strategies: Sethe can "[beat] back the past" by kneading dough every 
morning (73), by folding and double folding sheets (61), or by rubbing the 
leg of someone she loves (72); Paul D can "leave it alone" (71). But denial 
and forgetfulness are ultimately impossible as well as dangerous. As 
Sethe warns her daughter Denver, "If you go there--you who never was 
there--ifyou go there and stand in the place where it was, it will happen 
again; it will be there for you, waiting for you" (36). Ultimately, the 
characters (and the readers) must wrestle with the past just as Sethe 
wrestles with Beloved, who represents not only the ghost of Set he 's long-
dead daughter but also the "sixty million and more" dead slaves to whom 
Morrison dedicates her book. Readers learn what Paul D and Sethe learn: 
to put our stories next to someone who "is a friend of [ our] mind" and to 
realize that we are our own "best thing" (272-73). This ethic oflove--both 
love of others and love of self-tenders to us the agency necessary for 
escaping the repetitive circling of denial and the idealized dreams of 
forgetfulness. It offers a means of telling ourrememories as stories, using 
them as a means of getting on with our lives. As represented in this novel, 
Morrison's concept of rem emory exposes the past not simply as a series 
of fixed points on an abstract historical continuum but rather as a series 
of inscriptions in discourse and on our material bodies, inscriptions that 
continually circle through our present and form our identities, inscriptions 
that will control us if we do not acknowledge them and pass them on. 
What emerges from placing a revised Heideggerian notion of circling 
through time alongside Toni Morrison's rendering of the circling of time 
is a sense of a past that haunts the present. This past is both a cultural 
structure and an individual embodiment of that structure, with the 
embodiment being different in different people depending on their 
experiences with(in) the cultural structure. This usage mode ofhistoriog-
raphy enables us to deal with the past so that it may strengthen us (like 
Denver, we can walk off the porch). When we do not deal with the past, 
it saps our strength, relegating us either to emotional prisonhouses (for 
example, Paul D's rusty tin box of a heart) or to endless repetitions of the 
moments that landed us here (for example, Sethe's rememories of Sweet 
Home). When we change modes of historiography-that is, when we 
reject the dominant (and oh-so-desired) origin-to-happily-ever-aftermode 
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and embrace a not-so-dominant (and let's be honest, not-so-desired) 
usage-as-ever-present mode-we (re )cognize that narratives of history 
refuse to give up the ghost, so to speak, until (like Denver, Paul D, and 
Sethe) we refuse to pass on them so that, in tum, we can gamer the strength 
to pass them on. Such a (re)cognition of history enables us to eavesdrop 
and circle through time to expose the circling of time. Thus, we find 
ourselves accountable to ourselves and to others not for the then but for 
the then-that-is-now. 
The Trope of Whiteness, Whiteness as Embodied Trope 
In the United States, one site of usage (and accountability) for the then-
that-is-now is the trope of whiteness. In this section, I first define the terms 
trope and trope of whiteness; then I circle through history, eavesdropping, 
to expose how this trope resonates at this particular moment of usage. I 
will focus only on its dysfunctions as they are articulated by people of 
color and by white people. Though by no means a comprehensive 
discussion, what follows may help us analyze in the next section how 
these dysfunctions remake rhetorical theory. 
As we all know, tropes are figures of speech, such as metaphor, 
metonymy, analogy, and aposiopesis. Although such tropes are some-
times defined as "the dressing ofthought" or as a deviation from ordinary 
expression, they are much, much more (Corbett 459). Tropes designate 
the movement of a text, as when a prosecuting attorney employs a domino 
analogy to simplify a complex web of causation. Indeed, tropes designate 
the very movement oflanguage itself. Because all language is inherently 
figurative (that is, because a term always signifies something other than 
the term itself), all terms are tropes. Although tropes are terms within 
discourse, the socially constructed attitudes and actions associated with 
these terms become embodied in all of us (albeit differently) via our 
socialization; for example, in the United States we are born into discourse 
communities wherein the term student signifies certain attitudes and 
actions about learning and classroom behavior. Once embodied, these 
tropes, with their associated attitudes and actions, may (un)consciously 
inform our own attitudes and actions. This chicken-and-egg cycle contin-
ues in perpetuity, with discourse socializing people and people accepting, 
resisting, and revising this socialization via discursive practices. 
Like any other socially constructed category (student, teacher, dean, 
gender, race, class), whiteness is a trope, and the actions and attitudes 
associated with this trope are embodied in all of us (albeit differently) via 
our socialization. The real issue, however, is what we do with this trope 
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and its embodiment, both culturally and individually. Academic white-
ness studies attempts to answer this question. For example, in How the 
Irish Became White, Noel Ignatiev explores Irish immigration to the 
United States in the nineteenth century and describes his project as 
follows: "This book looks at how one group of people became white. Put 
another way, it asks how the Catholic Irish, an oppressed race in Ireland, 
became part of an oppressin~ race in America" (1). On the productive side 
of this process, the Irish, ir becoming white, could "sell themselves 
piecemeal instead of being sold for life, and later they could compete for 
jobs in all spheres instead of being confined to certain work"; indeed, Irish 
men (though not Irish women) could begin taking advantage of the full 
rights of citizenship (2-3). The dysfunctional side of this process (in 
addition to the aforementioned gender bias) is that in becoming white, the 
Irish did not alter the cultural structure of oppression but managed instead 
literally to work themselves into the racial category of privilege, thereby 
reinforcing already existing oppressive patterns for those still categorized 
as nonwhite (for example, American Indians, Chicanos(as), African 
Americans). Is Irish assimilation more complicated than what can be 
explained through a focus on economics and whiteness? Yes, it is 
complicated by factors such as the nation's industrial status, religion, 
regional politics, and the like. But Ignatiev's point is well-taken: white-
ness is a crucial factor in the process of assimilation and socialization. 
As a trope, whiteness designates both people and practices.s Yet, as 
AnnLouise Keating reminds us, a "conditional" relationship exists be-
tween white people and white practices. That is, while not everyone can 
be classified as a white person, everyone can perform white practices 
(907). Performing whiteness is a very visible practice for people of color. 
"Acting white" on the job or in school may gamer promotions or good 
grades (or, in the case ofa comedy routine by Paul Rodriguez or Chris 
Rock, lots oflucrative laughter). But acting white in homes and commu-
nities may gamer charges of betraying one's roots. Conversely, perform-
ing whiteness is often an invisible practice for white people who assume 
their own thinking and acting to be the norm. Like any trope, whiteness 
is historically and locally grounded, always already evolving and open to 
multiple interpretations. But as Ruth Frankenberg reminds us, in the 
United States whiteness has consistently signified privilege-a privilege 
that fosters stasis by resisting and denying differences (236-37).6 Histo-
rian David Roediger explains: "Whiteness describes, from Little Big 
Hom to Simi Valley, not a culture but precisely the absence of culture. It 
is the empty and therefore terrifying attempt to build an identity based on 
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what one isn't and on whom one can hold back" (Towards 13). In short, 
whiteness is typically defined in terms of what it is not-not African 
American, not Latina, not Chippewa, and so on. 
As a trope that fosters stasis by resisting and denying differences, 
whiteness has very real implications in everyone's daily life. People of 
color have astutely observed these implications in their struggle to 
survive. Some whites have also done so, by choice, in their effort to move 
politically and ethically against social injustice. But when most whites are 
asked what it means to be white in the United States, they simply stare 
blankly. Either they have never thought about it (because they don't have 
to) or they are afraid of answering for fear of being associated with 
extremist racist organizations, such as the KKK, that have for too long 
claimed whiteness as their own turf and defined it in their own terms. 
Notable exceptions are Frankenberg and Roediger, as well as Smith, 
whose Killers of the Dream predates the current whiteness studies 
movement yet provides an admirable model for naming and critiquing 
whiteness. 
People of color claim that whiteness signifies in myriad ways, ranging 
from acting white to terror. The core ofthis terror-white violence and its 
effects on everyone--is captured in Claude McKay's poem "The Lynch-
ing," which describes a lynched black man as a "swinging char," a 
"ghastly body swaying in the sun" (11.8, 10). It describes white female 
observers as: "never a one / Showed sorrow in her eyes of steely blue; / 
And little lads, lynchers that were to be, / Danced round the dreadful thing 
in fiendish glee" (11. 11-14). In "Representations of Whiteness in the 
Black Imagination," bell hooks argues that such representations of terror 
emerge not just from African Americans' stereotypes about white people 
but also from African Americans' ethnographic observations of white 
people. Such observations have often functioned as an African Ameri-
can survival strategy throughout U.S. history-from centuries of 
slavery to contemporary prison demographics, welfare reforms, cor-
porate glass ceilings, even unwelcoming classrooms (39-40). To deal 
with this then-that-is-now terror, hooks offers a simple yet difficult 
strategy: understanding how whiteness functions culturally without re-
sorting to an essentialized us-versus-them mentality that plays into the 
white desire for stasis. Her strategy is one that both she and a white male 
friend have employed: "Understanding how racism works, he can see 
the way in which whiteness acts to terrorize without seeing himself as 
bad, or all white people as bad, and all black people as good" (49). 
Many people of color also claim that whiteness signifies the drive to 
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consume others' lands and cultures. Ethiop (William J. Wilson) describes 
how white consumption functioned in the United States in the nineteenth 
century: "Restless, grasping, unsatiated, [whites] are ever on the lookout 
for not what is, or ought to be theirs, but for what they can get" (59). Alice 
Walker exposes the white consumption implicit in a "melting pot" 
mentality, which she believes is actually a way of normalizing difference 
in terms of whiteness. She makes this claim in "The Dummy in the 
Window: Joel Chandler Harris and the Invention of Uncle Remus," 
written in 1981. She argues that, by inserting Uncle Remus into the Brer 
FoxlBrer Rabbit stories, Harris robbed her of her heritage: "How did he 
steal it? By making me feel ashamed of it. In creating Uncle Remus, he 
placed an effective barrier between me and the stories that meant so much 
to me, the stories that could have meant so much to all of our children, the 
stories that they would have heard from their own people and not from 
Walt Disney" (239). And this white consumption is what encourages 
Lyman Lamartine, a Chippewa entrepreneur in Louise Erdrich's Love 
Medicine, to ponder turning the tables on white people by opening a bingo 
palace: "He'd ... teach Chippewas the right ways, the proper ways, the 
polite ways, to take money from retired white people who had farmed 
Indian hunting grounds, worked Indian jobs, lived high while their 
neighbors lived low, looked down ornevernoticed who was starving, who 
was lost" (327). Ironically, Lyman suggests a recycled white consump-
tion in order to counter white peoples' consumption of his ancestors' land 
and culture, and he justifies his own consumption in terms of prior 
ownership privileges and fairness. 
Many people of color have also associated whiteness with hypocrisy, 
especially religious hypocrisy, as when people profess Christian prin-
ciples yet practice racism. In "The Color of Heaven," historian Mia Bay 
exposes this hypocrisy when researching nineteenth-century white 
slaveowners' conceptions of heaven and finding it to be a "racially 
divided place" (69). And Martin Luther King, Jr. pinpoints this hypocrisy 
in "Letter from Birmingham Jail," addressed to eight white clergy in 
Alabama: "I have almost reached the regrettable conclusion that the 
Negro's great stumbling block in his stride toward freedom is not the 
White Citizen's Counciler or the Ku Klux Klanner, but the white moder-
ate, who is more devoted to 'order' than to justice; who prefers a negative 
peace which is the absence of tension to a positive peace which is the 
presence of justice" (892). 
People of color have also associated whiteness with a denial of race 
issues, a denial stemming from fear and guilt. In "White Man's Guilt," 
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James Baldwin maps the interrelated web of denial, fear, and guilt: it "is 
heard nowhere more plainly than in those stammering, terrified dialogues 
which white Americans sometimes entertain . . . the black man in 
America. The nature of this stammering can be reduced to a plea. Do not 
blame me. I was not there. I did not do it" (321-22). Yet, according to 
Baldwin, "on the same day, in another gathering and in the most private 
chamber of his heart always, the white American remains proud of that 
history for which he does not wish to pay, and from which, materially, he 
has profited so much" (322). By abating fear and guilt, denial creates a 
safe space in which white America may live without having to confront 
its past. 7 In his essay, Baldwin exposes the dominant either/or logic 
haunting whiteness in this country: either whiteness has perpetuated great 
violence, or it has fostered great accomplishments. There is little room in 
anyone's mind for a both/and logic, even though it may just be the ground 
needed for initiating genuine dialogue. 
People of color have also linked whiteness with an ignorance of other 
cultures, although they may disagree about what this ignorance signifies. 
In Amy Tan's The Joy Luck Club, Rich, the good-hearted white boyfriend 
of Chinese American Waverly Jong, arrives at her parents' home with a 
bottle of French wine, but Waverly's parents do not own wine glasses; he 
also calls them Tim and Linda (theirnames are Tin and Lindo) (196, 198). 
Tan's point is that whites are often ignorant not just of other cultures but 
also of their own ignorance of other cultures. Morrison sees this ignorance 
in literary studies less as an unconscious phenomenon than as a "willful 
critical blindness" (Playing 18). And in Massacre of the Dreamers, Ana 
Castillo (Chicana poet, fiction writer, and theorist) does not let whites off 
so easily: "The ignorance of white dominant society about [Chicana] 
ways, struggles in society, history, and culture is not an innocent and 
passive ignorance, it is a systematic and determined ignorance" (5). 
People of color have not always been alone in disclosing the meaning 
of whiteness. In Killers of the Dream, Smith makes visible the conver-
gence of bodies, tropes, and cultures. She also makes visible the intersec-
tions of multiple tropes (race, gender, class, region, sex), a move much 
heralded by 1990s feminists of all races: 
I shall not tell, here, of experiences that were different and special and 
belonged only to me, but those most white southerners born at the tum of 
the' century share with each other. Out of the intricate weaving of 
unnumbered threads, I shall pick out a few strands, a few designs that 
have to do with what we call color and race ... and politics ... and money 
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and how it is made ... and religion ... and sex and the body image ... 
and love ... and dreams of the Good and the killers of dreams. (27) 
Smith's ellipses are just as important as her terms. The ellipses invite 
readers to pause and contemplate each term individually (for example, 
"color and race," then "politics"); they also invite readers to link the terms 
together metonymically; and they invite readers to fill the gaps with their 
impressions of "white southerners born at the tum of the century" as well 
as with their own experiences and definitions. 
From her standpoint as a mid-century, upper-middle class, Southern 
white woman, Smith identifies the white "terror" not just with "the Ku 
Klux Klan and the lynchings I did not see" but also with "the gentle back-
door cruelties of 'nice people'" (12). Smith in no way implies that her 
experiences of white terror are comparable to the experiences of those 
lynched; however, she does analyze its influence on her own body and 
moral consciousness: 
The mother who taught me what I know of tenderness and love and 
compassion taught me also the bleak rituals of keeping Negroes in their 
"place." The father who rebuked me for an air of superiority toward 
schoolmates from the mill and rounded out his rebuke by gravely 
reminding me that "all men are brothers," trained me in the steel-rigid 
decorums I must demand of every colored male. They who so gravely 
taught me to split my body from my mind and both from my "soul," taught 
me also to split my conscience from my acts and Christianity from 
southern tradition. (27) 
Smith also analyzes the influence of this white terror on everyone else's 
body and moral consciousness and on the culture they all share: 
Something was wrong with a world that tells you that love is good and 
people are important and then forces you to deny love and to humiliate 
people. I knew, though I would not for years confess it aloud, that in trying 
to shut the Negro race away from us, we have shut ourselves away from 
so many good, creative, honest, deeply human things in life. I began to 
understand slowly at first but more clearly as the years passed, that the 
warped, distorted frame we have put around every Negro child from birth 
is around every white child also. (39) 
In her analysis, Smith employs a usage-based circling through time to 
expose the circling of time in her own body: "I am afraid this book has 
played tricks on me: I am caught again in those revolving doors of 
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childhood" (13). When writing, she grounds herself in her current 
moment, picking out "threads" from the past that still haunt her in order 
to explain her present. Her circling of time exposes her (and our) 
responsibility for the then-that-is-now. Smith explains: "We know White 
Supremacy is indefensible in today's world, we know that as an idea it is 
dead, but the bitter struggle goes on, ... wasting minds and time and hearts 
and economic resources, tying us to a past where ghost battles ghost. And 
while this happens the human spirit sits on the rim of things, waiting" 
(235). This ghostly battle represents the dichotomy of real and ideal that 
pervades racialized (and gendered and classed) discourses in the United 
States. And "so we stand," Smith says, "tied to the past and clutching at 
the stars!" (253). 
Before we can untie ourselves from the dysfunctional realities ofthe 
past and the dysfunctional idealizations of the present, we must make (at 
least) two moves. First, we must make visible and/or audible the reality 
of the then-that-is-now. Smith tried to do this in 1949. Academic white-
ness studies is attempting to do it now. For example, Lynn Worsham's 
"After Words" weaves her per~onal stories of performing whiteness into 
a critique of the discourses and cultures surrounding us. Second, we must 
stop hiding behind the ideal of color blindness. In addition to academic 
whiteness studies, some popular publications are attempting to do this 
too. For example, in a recent biography of Vince Lombardi, which lauds 
his anti-racist work while he coached the Green Bay Packers, author 
David Maraniss claims, "It has always been easy for whites to claim [the 
ideal of] color blindness in the United States since white is the dominant 
color in American society, but the claim often serves as a ruse for not 
recognizing the [real] obstacles faced by non-whites" (8). In other words, 
in academic and popular discourses, we must investigate whiteness, 
eavesdropping within history, so that bodies, tropes, and cultures may 
converge in moments of productive rhetorical usage, moments when 
personal and social change may be achieved. 
The Agencies of Rhetoric, Rhetorical Agents 
Discussions of history and whiteness are significant for rhetoric and 
composition because they invite, among other things, questions of ethics 
and agency. According to Lawrence Buell, "ethics has gained new 
resonance in literary studies," and, consequently, literary scholars are 
rethinking agency in its various guises-discursive agency, authorial 
agency, readerly agency, and sociopolitical (or cultural) agency (7, 12-
14). I would extend Buell's claim to rhetoric and composition. Rhetorical 
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studies (in all its multiplicity) is the site where discursive, authorial, 
readerly, and sociopolitical agencies have been kept in play and their 
intersections have been duly noted-even when biographical criticism 
privileged the author, New Criticism privileged the work, deconstruction 
privileged textuality, reader response criticism privileged the reader, and 
cultural studies privileged class. Indeed, if we associate discursive agency 
with tropes, authorial and readerly agencies with the body, and 
sociopolitical agency with culture, what emerges is not a battle for which 
site possesses agency but rather a question of how the agencies of different 
sites converge to produce moments of rhetorical usage. 
When I circle through history, at this moment, eavesdropping to trace 
how the dysfunctions of whiteness remake rhetorical theory and usage, I 
find that these four agencies are not simply concepts lifted from classical 
times and dropped into our lives; rather, they are concepts remade in the 
image of their moments of usage. In the twentieth century, for example, 
the whiteness-that-fosters-stasis has worked to circumscribe all four of 
these agencies. Granted (and this is an important point), whiteness is not 
the only force at work in this circumscription, but it has definite vested 
interests. What follows is an attempt to articulate some of these interests. 
Inspired by Jacqueline Jones Royster's "When the First Voice You Hear 
Is Not Your Own" and Kathleen Welch's "Interpreting the Silent' Aryan 
Model' of Histories of Classical Rhetoric," the following comments also 
invite more such work to be done. 
As a practice of discursive agency, the whiteness that desires stasis 
also encourages the denial of language play. Ana Castillo describes the 
performance of this denial as follows: "Word-play for the Mexican 
Spanish speaker is contagious, a reflection of our sense of irony and 
humor about life. . .. In attempting to do this with English dominant 
speakers-especially, but not exclusively white people-I am always 
disappointed to see that the unimaginative way they have been taught to 
hear language makes a complete disaster of my attempt at 'word-play'" 
(168). This denial suppresses the tropological functions oflanguage, and, 
by extension, it constrains the ways bodies, tropes, and cultures are 
imagined to converge. Let me offer four examples. 
First, the practice of whiteness-that-denies-Ianguage-play signifies 
an (un)conscious desire for closure in mythmaking and storytelling. As 
Leslie Marmon Silko claims, white culture foolishly tries to freeze frame 
stories to preserve them forever: "The folks at home [Laguna Pueblo] will 
say, 'Ifit's important, ifithas relevance, it will stay regardless of whether 
it's on video tape, taped, or written down.' It's only the western Europeans 
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who have this inflated pompous notion that every word, everything that's 
said or done is real important, and it's got to live on and on forever. And 
only Americans think that America ... [will] just continue on" (qtd. in 
Barnes 52). This particular practice of white ness reinforces the separation 
of whites from people of color, story from history, poetics from rhetoric. 
Second, the practice of whiteness-that-denies-Ianguage-play erases 
how blackness participates in the formation of whiteness. In "What 
America Would Be Like Without Blacks," Ralph Ellison explains: 
"Much of the sound of [U.S.] language is derived from the timbre of the 
African voice and the listening habits of the African ear. So there is a de'z 
and a do 'z of slave speech sounding beneath our most polished Harvard 
accents, and if there is such a thing as a Yale accent, there is aN egro wail 
in it-doubtlessly introduced there by Old Yalie John C. Calhoun, who 
probably got it from his mammy" (164). This practice of whiteness 
reinforces the dominant culture's tendency not to hear or listen to other 
cultures (especially women's voices) as well as its tendency to inflate its 
own autonomy and importance. 
Third, the practice of whiteness-that-denies-language-play also erases 
how whiteness participates in the formation of blackness.8 In Beloved, 
Stamp Paid brilliantly articulates for Paul D how whiteness inscribes 
blackness: "It wasn't the jungle blacks brought with them to this place 
from the other (livable) place. It was the jungle whitefolks planted in 
them. And it grew. It spread ... until it invaded the whites who had made 
it. ... Changed and altered them. Made them bloody, silly, worse than 
even they wanted to be, so scared were they of the jungle they had made. 
The screaming baboon lived under their own white skin; the red gums 
were their own" (198-99). As Stamp Paid implies, this practice of 
whiteness essentializes blackness and whiteness as biological destiny; it 
also obscures their status as tropes and ignores power differentials 
between definers and defined as well as the potential oflanguage use for 
personal and social change. 
Fourth, the practice of whiteness-that -denies-language-play not only 
effaces "colors" other than black and white but also hides the slippage of 
these categories of color. Cherrie Moraga's commentary on "light-
skinned breeds" exposes these effaced colors and the slippage between 
categories: 
With a Black lover in apartheid Boston I was seen as a whitegirl. When 
we moved to Brooklyn, we were both Ricans. In Harlem I became 
"Spanish." In Mexico, we were both Cubans. With my brown girlfriends 
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we be brown girls sitting on brownstones. We be family. Among Indians 
in the States I'm a half-breed who looks like every other breed, colored 
mixed with cowboy .... Among Chicanas, I am everybody's cousin 
Carmen. Whitegirls change my shade to a paler version. People think I'm 
Italian, Jewish. (232-33) 
Finally, despite this slippage, the practice of whiteness-that-denies-
language-play blinds and blindsides people by offering them socially 
constructed concepts, such as race and gender, presented as The Truth. 
Smith concretizes this claim when discussing the politicians of her 
childhood: "The singsong voices of politicians ... [were] telling us lies 
about skin color and a culture they were callously ignorant of.-lies made 
of their own fantasies, of their secret deviations-forcing decayed pieces 
of theirs and the region's obscenities into the minds of the young and 
leaving them there to fester" (12-13). According to Smith, these festering 
obscenities exist both on "semantic" and "somatic" levels; in other words, 
bodies are troped and tropes are embodied9 (130, 161). 
Fighting these festering obscenities is doubly difficult when 
tropological functions of language are placed in the background. Lan-
guage becomes literal, in the service of The Truth; language play becomes 
suspect; rhetorical negotiation is deemed dubious; and the possibilities of 
discursive agency are thereby limited. Also limited are possibilities we 
ascribe to authorial, readerly, and cultural agencies. To counter such 
limitations, teacher/scholars in rhetoric and composition studies must 
think seriously about how the tropological functions oflanguage connect 
to our concepts of truth/Truth, knowledge, and belief. We also must 
integrate our thinking consciously into our theories and praxes, including 
our pedagogy. Too often these concerns hover atthe edge of our thinking 
and doing, unspoken and unheard. For example, consider our injunction 
to students to "write clearly." As a trope, write clearly needs to be more 
fully interrogated. Scholars, teachers, and students all must ask: (1) what 
writerly and cultural attitudes and actions are associated with the trope 
write clearly?; (2) what benefits (there are many) are associated with it?; 
and (3) what gets lost in our stated and implied definitions of clear 
writing? (For example, clearly signifies differently in different discourse 
communities.) Such attention to language provides a means of question-
ing discursive agency and an opportunity to articulate authorial agency. 
As a practice of authorial agency,10 whiteness (in its desire for stasis) 
encourages what Nedra Reynolds calls the reduction of our concept of 
ethos to a concept of individual ethical appeal ("Ethos" 327-29). As 
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Reynolds shows, Aristotelian ethos is not merely the "ethical appeal" of 
an individual but is "a shared enterprise among members ofthe commu-
nity" with the community deciding "what constitutes justice, temperance, 
bravery, or ethics" (328). In the United States, we typically reduce ethos 
to individual ethical appeal, metonymically linking it to rugged individu-
alist ideology. This ideology is haunted by the ghost of St. Jean de 
Crevecoeur's 1782 American, a white male of European descent who 
succeeds on the basis of individual will and toil (7, 9). De Crevecoeur's 
description, along with other texts (both legal and literary), led Morrison 
to conclude that while American has been presented as an inclusive term 
it has often played out as a code for white male (Playing 39-44). Following 
Morrison's logic, the ethos of the rugged individualist in rhetorical theory 
must be understood as the narrow and exclusionary ethos of the rugged 
white male individualist. 
Limiting our concept of ethos to individual ethical appeal may work 
for de Crevecoeur's American because it is tailor-made in his own image. 
(To identify the then-that-is-now, we need look no further than presiden-
tial wanna-be Donald Trump.) But this limited sense of ethos does not 
always work for those falling outside of de Crevecoeur's category. A 
concept of ethos that celebrates individual will and toil ensures that 
"falling outside" will be interpreted in only one way: as failure of 
individual will and toil. Sometimes it is such a failure, but not always. 
Note, for example, the effects of falling outside of Milwaukee Public 
Schools' desegregation plan. A former MPS board member recently-
well, finally-admitted that the court-ordered school desegregation plan 
of the late 1970s ''was setup for 'white benefit' at the expense of African-
American children" and their communities (Williams At). In practical 
terms, this admission calls attention to the fact that white students stayed 
in their home communities unless they chose to attend magnet schools in 
African American neighborhoods, but African American students were 
compelled to attend outlying area schools. NAACP volunteer and school 
board member, Joyce Mallory, explains the consequences: 
What really hurts now is when I look at all these kids in prison, a lot of 
that is the result of thousands of kids not getting a good education and 
being forced, pushed and dropped out ofMPS in the last 20 years .... A 
lot of them dropped out because going to the Pulaskis, the Bay Views, the 
Hamiltons and the Madisons of this community weren't places where 
they could be educated in a climate and an environment that valued who 
they were as individuals. (qtd. in Williams AS) 
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When, as in the MPS example, the actual individual does not mesh with 
the existing cultural category of individual, "falling outside" may result 
from factors other than individual will and toil. But reducing ethos to 
individual ethical appeal occludes these other factors-what Reynolds 
calls the "spatial and social" dimension of Aristotelian ethos ("Ethos" 
327),11 what Buell calls readerly, discursive, and sociopolitical agencies 
(12-14), and what I call the convergence of bodies, tropes, and cultures. 
To combat this costly reduction, we must foster an expanded concept of ethos. 
The possibilities of an expanded ethos may be seen by examining the 
reception of Smith's text. In 1949, Killers was given a decidedly chilly 
reception, which disciplined not just Smith but other white writers.12 
In 1994, Killers was received more favorably. 13 Ifwe work from a reduced 
concept of ethos-one that is limited to individual ethical appeal-we 
might argue that only individual writers and speakers are responsible for 
their reception (for example, we might blame Smith for the chilly 
reception in 1949 and praise her for the warmer one in 1994). But if we 
work from an expanded concept of ethos-one that acknowledges its 
individual, discursive, and cultural components-we might argue that 
negative reception, such as Smith's initial reception, may represent a 
convergence of bodies, tropes, and cultures for an individual author but 
a failed convergence for the dominant white culture. We might also argue 
that successful reception, such as Smith's recent reception, represents a 
more successful convergence within the dominant white culture. While 
this expanded ethos rejects the possibility that ethos functions only as an 
individual enterprise, it retains the possibility that ethos emerges as a 
result of rhetorical negotiation in which speakers and writers are active 
agents (albeit with discursive and cultural limitations) in the dance of 
bodies, tropes, and cultures. 
As a practice ofreaderly agency, whiteness (in its desire for stasis) 
reinforces rhetorical theory's tendency to relegate readers to secondary 
importance in the making of meaning. Contrary to the prevailing view-
which holds that Aristotle's rhetorical theory uses audience as its founda-
tional category for classifying speeches and audience members (Rhetoric 
1.3.1358b.1-5), and that his concept of enthymeme invites audience 
members to insert their own ideas into the orator's gaps (2.23. 1400b.25-
35)--1 want to propose that enthymemic gaps are ones that the speaker/ 
writer purposefully employs so that audience members will feel smart, 
concur with the argument, and believe they are full partners in the making 
of meaning so that the speaker/writer's will may be realized without (too 
much) resistance. As Michelle Ballif claims, rarely do rhetorical theories 
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(or speakers or writers ) ask, "What is it that the audience wants" or desires 
or demands or needs? (51). 
Because whiteness is embodied differently in white people and 
people of color, whiteness socializes us all into different secondary 
positions of readerly agency. According to Castillo, white socialization 
gives white readers certain expectations: they expect to be included in a 
text "in a direct way, ifnot as subjects, then emotionally. Otherwise, they 
are disinterested, and even feel threatened when excluded" (17). Whether 
white readers accept or resist this socialization is for each to negotiate. 
According to Royster, white socialization gives readers of color different 
expectations, especially of white speakers and writers: "I have been 
compelled to listen to speakers, well-meaning though they may think they 
are, who signal to me rather clearly that subject position is everything. I 
have come to recognize, however, that when the subject matter is me and 
the voice is not mine, my sense of order and rightness is disrupted. In 
metaphoric fashion, these 'authorities' let me know, once again, that 
Columbus has discovered America and claims it now, claims it still for a 
European crown" (31). But just as European crowns may be overthrown, 
readerly agencies haunted by whiteness may be circumnavigated. 
Castillo, Royster, and Smith all offer critical readerly agencies for 
circumnavigating whiteness and its haunting legacy. Castillo's is the most 
drastic. She chooses to express authorial agency by not addressing white 
people directly. In Massacre of the Dreamers, she writes, 
I AM A BROWN WOMAN .... 
Throughout the history of the United States "I" as subject and object 
has been reserved for white authorship and readership. However, when 
I speak of woman within these pages, I speak very specifically of the 
woman described above .... (This also holds true for the use of the word 
men, children, people, and so on. I refer at all times to Chicanos/as-
mejicanos/as unless otherwise specified). (1) 
Castillo offers brown women readerly agency by saying, in effect, "At 
last, you are the subject-enjoy." But she carefully qualifies her claim: 
"Non-white readers" in the United States are "not asserting that our 
perspective is the only legitimate one, that it is superior to or should 
replace, repress, or censure others. What we are conscious of is that our 
reality is vastly different from that of the dominant culture" (5). Castillo 
likewise offers white readers a form ofreaderly agency that in effect says, 
"Get over it, but keep reading (eavesdropping)." She believes that 
Chicana struggle "is relevant to anyone trying to understand the world he 
or she lives in" (17). She does not position whites as subjects or even invite 
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them emotionally into her world; she therefore potentially proves her 
point about white readers' expectations each time one resists her. Thus, 
Castillo challenges white readers to critique not only her claims but also 
their own reactions to her claims. 
Royster's model of critical readerly agency offers all readers a more 
rhetorically (and emotionally) complicated positioning. In "When the 
First Voice You Hear Is Not Your Own," she demonstrates how two or 
more people may interact so as to approximate equal positioning: 
My experiences tell me that we need to do more than just talk and talk 
back. I believe that in this model we miss a critical moment. We need to 
talk, yes, and to talk back, yes, but when do we listen? How do we listen? 
How do we demonstrate that we honor and respect the person talking and 
what that person is saying, or what the person might say if we valued 
someone other than ourselves having a turn to speak? How do we 
translate listening into language and action, into the creation of an 
appropriate response? How do we really "talk back" rather than talk also? 
The goal is not, "You talk, I talk." The goal is better practices so that we 
can exchange perspectives, negotiate meaning, and create understanding 
with the intent of being in a good position to cooperate, when, like now, 
cooperation is absolutely necessary. (38) 
This listening model of readerly agency imagines a readerly agency that 
is inextricably intertwined with discursive, authorial, and cultural agen-
cies.14 Instead of submitting to traditional rhetorical moves in which 
authorial agency tries to control readerly agency, Royster offers the 
possibility of both agencies functioning as subject positions, with every-
one rotating in and out of each position, assuming respect for the process, 
the people, and each other's subject positions. 
Finally, Smith posits a model of critical readerly agency that demon-
strates the interactions of one person's many voices. Her readerly agency 
is also intertwined with discursive, authorial, and cultural agencies: "I was 
in dialogue with myself as I wrote, as well as with my hometown and my 
childhood and history and the future, and the past" (13). And, as Smith 
notes, this readerly agency has ethical dimensions: 
Our big problem is not civil rights nor even a free Africa-urgent as these 
are-but how to make into a related whole the split pieces of the human 
experience, how to bridge mythic and rational mind, how to connect our 
childhood with the present and the past with the future, how to relate the 
differing realities of science and religion and politics and art to each other 
and to ourselves. Man is a broken creature, yes; it is his nature as a human 
being to be so; but it is also his nature to create relationships that can span 
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the brokenness. This is his first responsibility; when he fails, he is 
inevitably destroyed. (21) 
Although this vision may seem utopian (and haunted by apocalypse), it is 
a possible ethical choice with material consequences. Note its then-that-
is-now echo in Victor Villanueva's Bootstraps: "Change is possible, I 
believe. Language used consciously, a matter of rhetoric, is a principal 
means-perhaps the means-by which change can begin to take place . 
. . . It's a utopian hope .... The utopian, I know, drives me, even when 
tempered by the practical" (121). And mention of "the practical" leads 
us directly to issues of cultural structures that must be negotiated. 
As a practice of cultural agency, whiteness (in its desire for stasis) 
occludes the influence of cultural structures-such as race, gender, class, 
and the like-on everyone's life, rendering these structures either invis-
ible or apparently unimportant. By now we can all rehearse the Marxist 
maxim that the most ideologically entrenched position is the one that 
appears invisible, unimportant, or natural. Smith concretizes this natural-
izing process in terms of the cultural structures of her own life and times: 
"Southern Tradition taught well: we learned our way oflife by doing. You 
never considered arguing with teacher, because you could not see her. 
You only felt the iron grip of her hand and knew you must go where all 
the other children were going. And you learned never, never, to get out of 
step, for this was a precision dance which you must do with deadly 
accuracy" (96; emphasis added). 
How does the practice of whiteness (in its desire for stasis) participate 
in this occlusion of cultural structures? Through denial. This practice of 
whiteness, which Baldwin claims denies race, further complicates that 
denial with other intersecting denials. For example, Villanueva's critique 
of how people of color are positioned within academia and the dominant 
white culture shows how ethnicity is complicated by a denial of class: "It's 
hard to discuss the class system in America, because for so long we 
believed that ours was a classless society. John Kenneth Galbraith 
believes that most Americans still hold to the notion and cites George 
Bush as saying that class is 'for European democracies or something 
else-it isn't for the United States of America. We are not going to be 
divided by class '" (56). In a critique of our field's reception of nineteenth-
century black women, Shirley Wilson Logan shows how ethnicity is 
complicated by a denial of difference within the category of gender. 
Logan speaks through Marsha Houston to remind us that "women of color 
do not experience sexism in addition to racism, but sexism in the context 
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o/racism; thus, they ... bear an altogether differen t burden from that borne 
by white women" (46). No doubt we could all list examples of denied and 
occluded cultural categories, such as age, religion, political affiliation. 
But the point is this: by denying the role of cultural structures in the 
construction of identity, whiteness perpetuates a theory and practice of 
what Villanueva calls "bootstraps" (xiv, 121). Are these denials and 
occlusions of cultural agency the result of a grand conscious conspiracy? 
Not exactly. If they were, they might be easier for insiders to see and for 
everyone to resist. The denials exist, the occlusions occur, and the status 
quo remains, because, like the segregating signs on the water fountains of 
Smith's childhood, whiteness is often taken "for granted" (57). 
Thus, one means of resistance is to stop taking whiteness for granted. 
Again, Smith's receptions exemplify this point. In 1949 Smith's authorial 
agency alone could not guarantee a positive reception of her book. 
Though body, trope, and culture had converged in 1949 for Smith and 
other people in a way that allowed them to see and to critique whiteness, 
they had not yet converged in the majority of white bodies or dominant 
discourses of white culture. As Smith notes, "The quickest way for a 
writer to be banned as an Outsider ... was for him to seek new words, new 
ways of interpreting the earth-shaking hour we live in" (224). No matter 
how carefully she had crafted her authorial agency, the dominant discur-
sive, readerly, and cultural agencies worked against her. Yet, Smith's 
experience is not the occasion for despair or the rationale for a retreat into 
gradualism. It is a model for how a resisting agency may challenge other 
agencies haunted by whiteness. 
In sum, whiteness (in its desire for stasis) celebrates a discursive 
agency in which language is made literal, an authorial agency in which 
ethos is reduced to individualism, a readerly agency in which readers are 
relegated to secondary importance in the construction of meanings, and 
a cultural agency in which the influence of cultural structures on identity 
is occluded. Such a practice of whiteness puts authorial agency on a 
pedestal, subordinates the other three, and denies the intertwining func-
tions of all four. Can the aforementioned dysfunctions be challenged in 
terms of how they remake rhetorical theory and rhetorical usages? As I 
have tried to demonstrate, some people have done so and, indeed, are 
doing so. As for the rest of us, a pertinent response maybe heard in Smith's 
conclusion (though it obviously does not address this question directly): 
"We have the means, the technics, we have the knowledge and insight and 
courage. All have synchronized for the first time in history. Do we have 
the desire? That is a question that each ofus must answer for himself' (253). 
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(In)Conclusion 
What evidence attests that the current convergence of bodies, the trope of 
whiteness, and mainstream U.S. culture is not a momentary anomaly? 
Within academic culture, there is whiteness studies. Within popular 
culture, there is Maraniss' biography of Lombardi. There is even the white 
guy at the CCCC convention cocktail party. Was he being snide or simply 
jocular when he claimed that it is hip to be a white guy again? To be honest, 
when I overheard his remark, I could not tell. But whether or not I am able 
to discern his intent is little cause for concern. As Reynolds reminds us, 
Aristotle, in one of his finer moments, says that '~e become just by doing 
just acts" (qtd. in "Ethos" 328). Perhaps the cocktail party guy will 
accidentally overhear himself and, as a result, embody the trope of 
whiteness in ways that will help him understand his accountability for the 
then-that-is-now. Perhaps he already has. Such are the possibilities of 
rhetoric. 
But whether or not the cocktail party guy accidently overhears, or 
purposefully eavesdrops on, himself, we should eavesdrop on him-and 
then act on what we hear. Such are our challenges as scholars and teachers. 
As scholars, we must reflect on the influence of whiteness in our 
discipline, our professional journals, our conventions, our books and 
articles, our professional networks, and, dare I say, even our friendships. 
As teachers, we must introduce students to rhetorical tactics that will 
enable them to reflect on the influence of whiteness in their own lives and 
cultures. Many tactics are available. For example, Susan Jarratt offers 
rereading (xxiv); Cheryl Glenn, remapping rhetorical territory (1-17); 
Roxanne Mountford, resisting empiricism; Jackie Royster and Joyce 
Middleton, listening (Royster 38); Michelle Ballif, speaking as a listener 
(59); Nedra Reynolds, interrupting ("Interrupting" 70-1); Diane Davis, 
hearing alnew; Shirley Logan, speaking the unspeakable (55); Ellen Gil-
Gomez, piece-making (204); Lynn Worsham, composing storied cultural 
critiques (336-46). To that list, I add eavesdropping. By living and 
teaching such tactics in ways that are pertinent for our particular locales, 
we remind ourselves and our students that even as history, whiteness, and 
rhetoric encircle us, we have access to agencies (admittedly in varying 
degrees) for circling through them,lS 
Marquette University 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 
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Notes 
1. Poulakos provides one answer to this question by invoking a Nietzschean 
critical historiography: "The critical conception of the past operates from the 
assumption that much of what the past has produced is dysfunctional and useless 
because it was not, indeed, it could not have been, produced with our present 
predicament in mind. Therefore, if we are to place history in the service of our 
life [a Nietzschean imperative], we must rid ourselves of the burdens of the past 
and strive to create from them materials that are useful, that augment our 
capacity to live joyfully" (90). Poulakos' source for this critical historiography 
is Nietzsche's "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life," which 
posits three kinds of history-monumental, antiquarian, and critical (72-76). 
(I'd like to thank Michelle Ballif for referring me to these sources.) 
2. For landmark research associated with the contemporary whiteness 
studies movement, see Allen; Dyer; Fine, et a1.; Frankenberg; Hill. 
3. For other challenges to the origins mode of historiography, see Jarratt's 
feminist sophistic historiography (10-12) and Vitanza's Nietzschean (sophistic) 
"sub/versive" rhetoric ("Notes" 100-01, 106-14). 
4. Rich's description of the poetic moment also explains why the conver-
gence of body, trope, and culture is often interpreted as a moment of origin: this 
convergence is "the crossing of trajectories of two (or more) elements that might 
not otherwise have known simultaneity. When this happens, a piece of the 
universe is revealed as iffor the first time" (8; emphasis added). Her "as if' 
exposes that what we name moments of origin are actually moments of usage, 
which (given our deep desire for origins) are often received as if they were 
origins. 
5. One important white institution is law. As C. Harris argues, within the 
legal system whiteness emerges as property: "Whiteness-the right to white 
identity as embraced by the law-is property ifby property one means all of a 
person's legal rights" (105). 
6. People of color have also been aware that whiteness represents privilege. 
Powell claims that the use of the term "'white privilege' is a redundancy [since] 
Whiteness has always signified worthiness, inclusion and acceptance" (qtd. in 
Roediger, Black 100). 
7. In Massacre of the Dreamers, Castillo concretizes this safe space in terms 
of writing. Quoting Ivan Argiielles, she claims that white writing is "evocative, 
finely crafted, witty, urbane, sophisticated, occasionally troubling, but always 
safe ... sometimes politically correct, but sanitized and with only faint air-
brushed innuendos of anger" (168; emphasis added). 
8. Another example of how whiteness informs blackness is played with in 
Rogers' "Debating the Senator" (1917), in which a black pullman porter informs 
a white segregationist Senator from Oklahoma that 
"The word, slave, has a white origin." 
"A white origin!" 
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"Yes, sir, it comes from 'Slav,' a very white-skinned people who were 
reduced to slavery by the Germans .... " (98) 
9. Smith demonstrates the "semantic" level of discursive socialization 
when she describes how adult white Southerners of a certain class denigrate their 
childhood love for the black women who cared for them by naming these women 
"nurses" and then tearing up at spirituals for the rest of their lives instead of 
continuing a caring relationship with these women (130). Smith demonstrates 
the "somatic" level of discursive socialization when she describes how South-
erners use language (she implies but never states the n-word) to dehumanize 
African Americans andjustitY whites' physical torture of them. This socializa-
tion is played out on both black and white bodies, obviously with very different 
results (161). 
10. I use Buell's term "authorial agency" to signify positions of production 
(i.e, speaking and writing), and I use his term "readerly agency" to signify 
positioris of reception (i.e., reading and listening). While I recognize that these 
forms of agency interact, I also think the power differentials of these positions, 
as they play out in U.S. culture, are worth exploring separately. 
11. Reynolds reminds us that the community in which Aristotle was writing 
precluded the partiGipation of women and slaves within communal decision-
making ("Ethos" 329). Consequently, even ifit were possible, simply lifting the 
theory and dropping it into our lives won't work. We must remake it for our own 
historical moment. 
12. Gladney explains the silencing of Smith in 1949: "Although Strange 
Fruit [an interracial love story set in the South after World War I] brought Smith 
international acclaim and greatly expanded her sphere of influence as a social 
critic, Killers of the Dream ... affronted too many southerners-including 
powerful moderates-to be financially or critically successful. After an initial 
30,000 copies, sales dropped dramatically, and when reviewers and critics 
refused to accord it critical notice, Smith was effectively silenced as a writer . 
. . . This 'subject matter and Smith's innovative style were met with hostility, or 
deliberate silence, by the literary establishment, the New Critics, and the general 
public of Cold War America" (iv). 
13. lit 1994 not only was Killers reviewed but Smith was hailed by critics 
as "original and insightful" (Hobson 756), as "bold and honest" (778-79), as 
"one of the most important white civil rights figures of her time, virtually alone 
among white Southern 'liberals' in condemning gradualism in all of its forms 
and in calling for an immediate end to institutionalized segregation in the interest 
of all Southerners, white as well as black" (Watson 470). Also see C. Carr and 
Romine. 
14. Two other responses to Royster's question "How do we listen?" may be 
found in Ballifs and Ratcliffe's articles on listening. 
15. My thanks to the anonymous reviewers for their rich suggestions for 
revision, and especially to Lynn Worsham for her comments on eavesdropping. 
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